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Abstract
We show how to turn any classifier that classi-
fies well under Gaussian noise into a new classi-
fier that is certifiably robust to adversarial per-
turbations under the `2 norm. This “random-
ized smoothing” technique has been proposed re-
cently in the literature, but existing guarantees are
loose. We prove a tight robustness guarantee in
`2 norm for smoothing with Gaussian noise. We
use randomized smoothing to obtain an ImageNet
classifier with e.g. a certified top-1 accuracy of
49% under adversarial perturbations with `2 norm
less than 0.5 (=127/255). No certified defense
has been shown feasible on ImageNet except for
smoothing. On smaller-scale datasets where com-
peting approaches to certified `2 robustness are
viable, smoothing delivers higher certified accu-
racies. Our strong empirical results suggest that
randomized smoothing is a promising direction
for future research into adversarially robust classi-
fication. Code and models are available at http:
//github.com/locuslab/smoothing.
1. Introduction
Modern image classifiers achieve high accuracy on i.i.d.
test sets but are not robust to small, adversarially-chosen
perturbations of their inputs (Szegedy et al., 2014; Biggio
et al., 2013). Given an image x correctly classified by, say,
a neural network, an adversary can usually engineer an ad-
versarial perturbation δ so small that x + δ looks just like
x to the human eye, yet the network classifies x + δ as a
different, incorrect class. Many works have proposed heuris-
tic methods for training classifiers intended to be robust to
adversarial perturbations. However, most of these heuristics
have been subsequently shown to fail against suitably pow-
erful adversaries (Carlini & Wagner, 2017; Athalye et al.,
2018; Uesato et al., 2018). In response, a line of work on
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Figure 1. Evaluating the smoothed classifier at an input x. Left:
the decision regions of the base classifier f are drawn in differ-
ent colors. The dotted lines are the level sets of the distribution
N (x, σ2I). Right: the distribution f(N (x, σ2I)). As discussed
below, pA is a lower bound on the probability of the top class and
pB is an upper bound on the probability of each other class. Here,
g(x) is “blue.”
.
certifiable robustness studies classifiers whose prediction at
any point x is verifiably constant within some set around x
(Wong & Kolter, 2018; Raghunathan et al., 2018a, e.g.). In
most of these works, the robust classifier takes the form of a
neural network. Unfortunately, all existing approaches for
certifying the robustness of neural networks have trouble
scaling to networks that are large and expressive enough to
solve problems like ImageNet.
One workaround is to look for robust classifiers that are not
neural networks. Recently, two papers (Lecuyer et al., 2019;
Li et al., 2018) showed that an operation we call randomized
smoothing1 can transform any arbitrary base classifier f into
a new “smoothed classifier” g that is certifiably robust in
`2 norm. Let f be an arbitrary classifier which maps inputs
Rd to classes Y . For any input x, the smoothed classifier’s
prediction g(x) is defined to be the class which f is most
likely to classify the random variableN (x, σ2I) as. That is,
g(x) returns the most probable prediction by f of random
Gaussian corruptions of x.
If the base classifier f is most likely to classify N (x, σ2I)
as x’s correct class, then the smoothed classifier g will be
1Smoothing was proposed under the name “PixelDP” (for dif-
ferential privacy). We use a different name since our improved
analysis does not involve differential privacy.
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correct at x. But the smoothed classifier g will also possess
a desirable property that the base classifier may lack: one
can verify that g’s prediction is constant within an `2 ball
around any input x, simply by estimating the probabilities
with which f classifiesN (x, σ2I) as each class. The higher
the probability with which f classifies N (x, σ2I) as the
most probable class, the larger the `2 radius around x in
which g provably returns that class.
Lecuyer et al. (2019) proposed randomized smoothing as
a provable adversarial defense, and used it to train the first
certifiably robust classifier for ImageNet. Subsequently, Li
et al. (2018) proved a stronger robustness guarantee. How-
ever, both of these guarantees are loose, in the sense that
the smoothed classifier g is provably always more robust
than the guarantee indicates. In this paper, we prove the
first tight robustness guarantee for randomized smoothing.
Our analysis reveals that smoothing with Gaussian noise
naturally induces certifiable robustness under the `2 norm.
We suspect that other, as-yet-unknown noise distributions
might induce robustness to other perturbation sets such as
general `p norm balls.
Randomized smoothing has one major drawback. If f is
a neural network, it is not possible to exactly compute the
probabilities with which f classifies N (x, σ2I) as each
class. Therefore, it is not possible to exactly evaluate g’s
prediction at any input x, or to exactly compute the radius
in which this prediction is certifiably robust. Instead, we
present Monte Carlo algorithms for both tasks that are guar-
anteed to succeed with arbitrarily high probability.
Despite this drawback, randomized smoothing enjoys sev-
eral compelling advantages over other certifiably robust
classifiers proposed in the literature: it makes no assump-
tions about the base classifier’s architecture, it is simple to
implement and understand, and, most importantly, it per-
mits the use of arbitrarily large neural networks as the base
classifier. In contrast, other certified defenses do not cur-
Table 1. Approximate certified accuracy on ImageNet. Each row
shows a radius r, the best hyperparameter σ for that radius, the
approximate certified accuracy at radius r of the corresponding
smoothed classifier, and the standard accuracy of the corresponding
smoothed classifier. To give a sense of scale, a perturbation with
`2 radius 1.0 could change one pixel by 255, ten pixels by 80, 100
pixels by 25, or 1000 pixels by 8. Random guessing on ImageNet
would attain 0.1% accuracy.
`2 RADIUS BEST σ CERT. ACC (%) STD. ACC(%)
0.5 0.25 49 67
1.0 0.50 37 57
2.0 0.50 19 57
3.0 1.00 12 44
Figure 2. The smoothed classifier’s prediction at an input x (left)
is defined as the most likely prediction by the base classifier on
random Gaussian corruptions of x (right; σ = 0.5). Note that this
Gaussian noise is much larger in magnitude than the adversarial
perturbations to which g is provably robust. One interpretation of
randomized smoothing is that these large random perturbations
“drown out” small adversarial perturbations.
rently scale to large networks. Indeed, smoothing is the only
certified adversarial defense which has been shown feasible
on the full-resolution ImageNet classification task.
We use randomized smoothing to train state-of-the-art certi-
fiably `2-robust ImageNet classifiers; for example, one of
them achieves 49% provable top-1 accuracy under adver-
sarial perturbations with `2 norm less than 127/255 (Table
1). We also demonstrate that on smaller-scale datasets like
CIFAR-10 and SHVN, where competing approaches to cer-
tified `2 robustness are feasible, randomized smoothing can
deliver better certified accuracies, both because it enables
the use of larger networks and because it does not constrain
the expressivity of the base classifier.
2. Related Work
Many works have proposed classifiers intended to be ro-
bust to adversarial perturbations. These approaches can
be broadly divided into empirical defenses, which empiri-
cally seem robust to known adversarial attacks, and certified
defenses, which are provably robust to certain kinds of ad-
versarial perturbations.
Empirical defenses The most successful empirical de-
fense to date is adversarial training (Goodfellow et al.,
2015; Kurakin et al., 2017; Madry et al., 2018), in which
adversarial examples are found during training (often using
projected gradient descent) and added to the training set.
Unfortunately, it is typically impossible to tell whether a
prediction by an empirically robust classifier is truly robust
to adversarial perturbations; the most that can be said is that
a specific attack was unable to find any. In fact, many heuris-
tic defenses proposed in the literature were later “broken”
by stronger adversaries (Carlini & Wagner, 2017; Athalye
et al., 2018; Uesato et al., 2018; Athalye & Carlini, 2018).
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Aiming to escape this cat-and-mouse game, a growing body
of work has focused on defenses with formal guarantees.
Certified defenses A classifier is said to be certifiably ro-
bust if for any input x, one can easily obtain a guarantee that
the classifier’s prediction is constant within some set around
x, often an `2 or `∞ ball. In most work in this area, the
certifiably robust classifier is a neural network. Some works
propose algorithms for certifying the robustness of generi-
cally trained networks, while others (Wong & Kolter, 2018;
Raghunathan et al., 2018a) propose both a robust training
method and a complementary certification mechanism.
Certification methods are either exact (a.k.a “complete”) or
conservative (a.k.a “sound but incomplete”). In the context
of `p norm-bounded perturbations, exact methods take a
classifier g, input x, and radius r, and report whether or
not there exists a perturbation δ within ‖δ‖ ≤ r for which
g(x) 6= g(x+ δ). In contrast, conservative methods either
certify that no such perturbation exists or decline to make a
certification; they may decline even when it is true that no
such perturbation exists. Exact methods are usually based
on Satisfiability Modulo Theories (Katz et al., 2017; Carlini
et al., 2017; Ehlers, 2017; Huang et al., 2017) or mixed
integer linear programming (Cheng et al., 2017; Lomuscio
& Maganti, 2017; Dutta et al., 2017; Fischetti & Jo, 2018;
Bunel et al., 2018). Unfortunately, no exact methods have
been shown to scale beyond moderate-sized (100,000 acti-
vations) networks (Tjeng et al., 2019), and networks of that
size can only be verified when they are trained in a manner
that impairs their expressivity.
Conservative certification is more scalable. Some conser-
vative methods bound the global Lipschitz constant of the
neural network (Gouk et al., 2018; Tsuzuku et al., 2018;
Anil et al., 2019; Cisse et al., 2017), but these approaches
tend to be very loose on expressive networks. Others mea-
sure the local smoothness of the network in the vicinity of a
particular input x. In theory, one could obtain a robustness
guarantee via an upper bound on the local Lipschitz con-
stant of the network (Hein & Andriushchenko, 2017), but
computing this quantity is intractable for general neural net-
works. Instead, a panoply of practical solutions have been
proposed in the literature (Wong & Kolter, 2018; Wang et al.,
2018a;b; Raghunathan et al., 2018a;b; Wong et al., 2018;
Dvijotham et al., 2018b;a; Croce et al., 2019; Gehr et al.,
2018; Mirman et al., 2018; Singh et al., 2018; Gowal et al.,
2018; Weng et al., 2018a; Zhang et al., 2018). Two themes
stand out. Some approaches cast verification as an opti-
mization problem and import tools such as relaxation and
duality from the optimization literature to provide conserva-
tive guarantees (Wong & Kolter, 2018; Wong et al., 2018;
Raghunathan et al., 2018a;b; Dvijotham et al., 2018b;a).
Others step through the network layer by layer, maintaining
at each layer an outer approximation of the set of activations
reachable by a perturbed input (Mirman et al., 2018; Singh
et al., 2018; Gowal et al., 2018; Weng et al., 2018a; Zhang
et al., 2018). None of these local certification methods have
been shown to be feasible on networks that are large and
expressive enough to solve modern machine learning prob-
lems like the ImageNet classification task. Also, all either
assume specific network architectures (e.g. ReLU activa-
tions or a layered feedforward structure) or require extensive
customization for new network architectures.
Related work involving noise Prior works have proposed
using a network’s robustness to Gaussian noise as a proxy
for its robustness to adversarial perturbations (Weng et al.,
2018b; Ford et al., 2019), and have suggested that Gaussian
data augmentation could supplement or replace adversar-
ial training (Zantedeschi et al., 2017; Kannan et al., 2018).
Smilkov et al. (2017) observed that averaging a classifier’s
input gradients over Gaussian corruptions of an image yields
very interpretable saliency maps. The robustness of neural
networks to random noise has been analyzed both theo-
retically (Fawzi et al., 2016; Franceschi et al., 2018) and
empirically (Dodge & Karam, 2017). Finally, Webb et al.
(2019) proposed a statistical technique for estimating the
noise robustness of a classifier more efficiently than naive
Monte Carlo simulation; we did not use this technique since
it appears to lack formal high-probability guarantees. While
these works hypothesized relationships between a neural net-
work’s robustness to random noise and the same network’s
robustness to adversarial perturbations, randomized smooth-
ing instead uses a classifier’s robustness to random noise to
create a new classifier robust to adversarial perturbations.
Randomized smoothing Randomized smoothing has
been studied previously for adversarial robustness. Sev-
eral works (Liu et al., 2018; Cao & Gong, 2017) proposed
similar techniques as heuristic defenses, but did not prove
any guarantees. Lecuyer et al. (2019) used inequalities
from the differential privacy literature to prove an `2 and
`1 robustness guarantee for smoothing with Gaussian and
Laplace noise, respectively. Subsequently, Li et al. (2018)
used tools from information theory to prove a stronger `2 ro-
bustness guarantee for Gaussian noise. However, all of these
robustness guarantees are loose. In contrast, we prove a tight
robustness guarantee in `2 norm for randomized smoothing
with Gaussian noise.
3. Randomized smoothing
Consider a classification problem from Rd to classes Y .
As discussed above, randomized smoothing is a method for
constructing a new, “smoothed” classifier g from an arbitrary
base classifier f . When queried at x, the smoothed classifier
g returns whichever class the base classifier f is most likely
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to return when x is perturbed by isotropic Gaussian noise:
g(x) = arg max
c∈Y
P(f(x+ ε) = c) (1)
where ε ∼ N (0, σ2I)
An equivalent definition is that g(x) returns the class c
whose pre-image {x′ ∈ Rd : f(x′) = c} has the largest
probability measure under the distribution N (x, σ2I). The
noise level σ is a hyperparameter of the smoothed classifier
g which controls a robustness/accuracy tradeoff; it does not
change with the input x. We leave undefined the behavior
of g when the argmax is not unique.
We will first present our robustness guarantee for the
smoothed classifier g. Then, since it is not possible to
exactly evaluate the prediction of g at x or to certify the ro-
bustness of g around x, we will give Monte Carlo algorithms
for both tasks that succeed with arbitrarily high probability.
3.1. Robustness guarantee
Suppose that when the base classifier f classifiesN (x, σ2I),
the most probable class cA is returned with probability pA,
and the “runner-up” class is returned with probability pB .
Our main result is that smoothed classifier g is robust around
xwithin the `2 radiusR = σ2 (Φ
−1(pA)−Φ−1(pB)), where
Φ−1 is the inverse of the standard Gaussian CDF. This result
also holds if we replace pA with a lower bound pA and we
replace pB with an upper bound pB .
Theorem 1. Let f : Rd → Y be any deterministic or
random function, and let ε ∼ N (0, σ2I). Let g be defined
as in (1). Suppose cA ∈ Y and pA, pB ∈ [0, 1] satisfy:
P(f(x+ ε) = cA) ≥ pA ≥ pB ≥ max
c6=cA
P(f(x+ ε) = c) (2)
Then g(x+ δ) = cA for all ‖δ‖2 < R, where
R =
σ
2
(Φ−1(pA)− Φ−1(pB)) (3)
We now make several observations about Theorem 12
• Theorem 1 assumes nothing about f . This is crucial
since it is unclear which well-behavedness assump-
tions, if any, are satisfied by modern deep architectures.
• The certified radius R is large when: (1) the noise level
σ is high, (2) the probability of the top class cA is high,
and (3) the probability of each other class is low.
2After the dissemination of this work, a more general result
was published in Levine et al. (2019); Salman et al. (2019): if h :
Rd → [0, 1] is a function and hˆ is the “smoothed” version hˆ(x) =
Eε∼N (0,σ2I)[h(x + ε)], then the function x 7→ Φ−1(hˆ(x)) is
1/σ-Lipschitz. Theorem 1 can be proved by applying this result to
the functions fc(x) = 1[f(x) = c] for each class c.
• The certified radius R goes to ∞ as pA → 1 and
pB → 0. This should sound reasonable: the Gaussian
distribution is supported on all of Rd, so the only way
that f(x + ε) = cA with probability 1 is if f = cA
almost everywhere.
Both Lecuyer et al. (2019) and Li et al. (2018) proved `2
robustness guarantees for the same setting as Theorem 1, but
with different, smaller expressions for the certified radius.
However, our `2 robustness guarantee is tight: if (2) is all
that is known about f , then it is impossible to certify an `2
ball with radius larger than R. In fact, it is impossible to
certify any superset of the `2 ball with radius R:
Theorem 2. Assume pA + pB ≤ 1. For any perturbation
δ with ‖δ‖2 > R, there exists a base classifier f consistent
with the class probabilities (2) for which g(x+ δ) 6= cA.
Theorem 2 shows that Gaussian smoothing naturally in-
duces `2 robustness: if we make no assumptions on the base
classifier beyond the class probabilities (2), then the set of
perturbations to which a Gaussian-smoothed classifier is
provably robust is exactly an `2 ball.
The complete proofs of Theorems 1 and 2 are in Appendix
A. We now sketch the proofs in the special case when there
are only two classes.
Theorem 1 (binary case). Suppose pA ∈ ( 12 , 1] satisfies
P(f(x + ε) = cA) ≥ pA. Then g(x + δ) = cA for all
‖δ‖2 < σΦ−1(pA).
Proof sketch. Fix a perturbation δ ∈ Rd. To guarantee
that g(x + δ) = cA, we need to show that f classifies the
translated Gaussian N (x + δ, σ2I) as cA with probability
> 12 . However, all we know about f is that f classifiesN (x, σ2I) as cA with probability ≥ pA. This raises the
question: out of all possible base classifiers f which classify
N (x, σ2I) as cA with probability ≥ pA, which one f∗
classifiesN (x+δ, σ2I) as cA with the smallest probability?
One can show using an argument similar to the Neyman-
Pearson lemma (Neyman & Pearson, 1933) that this “worst-
case” f∗ is a linear classifier whose decision boundary is
normal to the perturbation δ (Figure 3):
f∗(x′) =
{
cA if δT (x′ − x) ≤ σ‖δ‖2Φ−1(pA)
cB otherwise
(4)
This “worst-case” f∗ classifies N (x + δ, σ2I) as cA with
probability Φ
(
Φ−1(pA)− ‖δ‖2σ
)
. Therefore, to ensure that
even the “worst-case” f∗ classifiesN (x+δ, σ2I) as cA with
probability > 12 , we solve for those δ for which
Φ
(
Φ−1(pA)− ‖δ‖2
σ
)
>
1
2
which is equivalent to the condition ‖δ‖2 < σΦ−1(pA).
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x+ δ
x
x+ δ
x
Figure 3. Illustration of f∗ in two dimensions. The concentric
circles are the density contours ofN (x, σ2I) andN (x+ δ, σ2I).
Out of all base classifiers f which classifyN (x, σ2I) as cA (blue)
with probability ≥ pA, such as both classifiers depicted above,
the “worst-case” f∗ — the one which classifiesN (x+ δ, σ2I) as
cA with minimal probability — is depicted on the right: a linear
classifier with decision boundary normal to the perturbation δ.
Theorem 2 is a simple consequence: for any δ with ‖δ‖2 >
R, the base classifier f∗ defined in (4) is consistent with (2);
yet if f∗ is the base classifier, then g(x+ δ) = cB .
Figure 5 (left) plots our `2 robustness guarantee against
the guarantees derived in prior work. Observe that our
R is much larger than that of Lecuyer et al. (2019) and
moderately larger than that of Li et al. (2018). Appendix I
derives the other two guarantees using this paper’s notation.
Linear base classifier A two-class linear classifier
f(x) = sign(wTx + b) is already certifiable: the dis-
tance from any input x to the decision boundary is |wTx+
b|/‖w‖2, and no perturbation δ with `2 norm less than this
distance can possibly change f ’s prediction. In Appendix B
we show that if f is linear, then the smoothed classifier g is
identical to the base classifier f . Moreover, we show that our
bound (3) will certify the true robust radius |wTx+ b|/‖w‖,
rather than a smaller, overconservative radius. Therefore,
when f is linear, there always exists a perturbation δ just
beyond the certified radius which changes g’s prediction.
Noise level can scale with image resolution Since our
expression (3) for the certified radius does not depend ex-
plicitly on the data dimension d, one might worry that ran-
domized smoothing is less effective for images of higher
resolution — certifying a fixed `2 radius is “less impressive”
for, say, a 224× 224 image than for a 56× 56 image. How-
ever, as illustrated by Figure 4, images in higher resolution
can tolerate higher levels σ of isotropic Gaussian noise be-
fore their class-distinguishing content gets destroyed. As
a consequence, in high resolution, smoothing can be per-
formed with a larger σ, leading to larger certified radii. See
Appendix G for a more rigorous version of this argument.
3.2. Practical algorithms
We now present practical Monte Carlo algorithms for eval-
uating g(x) and certifying the robustness of g around x.
More details can be found in Appendix C.
3.2.1. PREDICTION
Evaluating the smoothed classifier’s prediction g(x) re-
quires identifying the class cA with maximal weight in the
categorical distribution f(x+ ε). The procedure described
in pseudocode as PREDICT draws n samples of f(x + ε)
by running n noise-corrupted copies of x through the base
classifier. Let cˆA be the class which appeared the largest
number of times. If cˆA appeared much more often than any
other class, then PREDICT returns cˆA. Otherwise, it abstains
from making a prediction. We use the hypothesis test from
Hung & Fithian (2019) to calibrate the abstention threshold
so as to bound by α the probability of returning an incorrect
answer. PREDICT satisfies the following guarantee:
Proposition 1. With probability at least 1 − α over the
randomness in PREDICT, PREDICT will either abstain or
return g(x). (Equivalently: the probability that PREDICT
returns a class other than g(x) is at most α.)
The function SAMPLEUNDERNOISE(f , x, num, σ) in the
pseudocode draws num samples of noise, ε1 . . . εnum ∼
N (0, σ2I), runs each x + εi through the base classifier f ,
and returns a vector of class counts. BINOMPVALUE(nA,
nA +nB , p) returns the p-value of the two-sided hypothesis
test that nA ∼ Binomial(nA + nB , p).
Even if the true smoothed classifier g is robust at radius R,
PREDICT will be vulnerable in a certain sense to adversarial
perturbations with `2 norm slightly less than R. By engi-
neering a perturbation δ for which f(x+ δ + ε) puts mass
just over 12 on class cA and mass just under
1
2 on class cB ,
an adversary can force PREDICT to abstain at a high rate. If
this scenario is of concern, a variant of Theorem 1 could be
proved to certify a radius in which P(f(x+ δ+ ε) = cA) is
larger by some margin than maxc6=cA P(f(x+ δ + ε) = c).
3.2.2. CERTIFICATION
Evaluating and certifying the robustness of g around an
input x requires not only identifying the class cA with maxi-
mal weight in f(x+ ε), but also estimating a lower bound
Figure 4. Left to right: clean 56 x 56 image, clean 224 x 224 image,
noisy 56 x 56 image (σ = 0.5), noisy 224 x 224 image (σ = 0.5).
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Pseudocode for certification and prediction
# evaluate g at x
function PREDICT(f , σ, x, n, α)
counts← SAMPLEUNDERNOISE(f , x, n, σ)
cˆA, cˆB ← top two indices in counts
nA, nB ← counts[cˆA], counts[cˆB]
if BINOMPVALUE(nA, nA + nB , 0.5) ≤ α return cˆA
else return ABSTAIN
# certify the robustness of g around x
function CERTIFY(f , σ, x, n0, n, α)
counts0← SAMPLEUNDERNOISE(f, x, n0, σ)
cˆA ← top index in counts0
counts← SAMPLEUNDERNOISE(f, x, n, σ)
pA ← LOWERCONFBOUND(counts[cˆA], n, 1− α)
if pA > 12 return prediction cˆA and radius σΦ
−1(pA)
else return ABSTAIN
pA on the probability that f(x + ε) = cA and an upper
bound pB on the probability that f(x+ ε) equals any other
class. Doing all three of these at the same time in a sta-
tistically correct manner requires some care. One simple
solution is presented in pseudocode as CERTIFY: first, use
a small number of samples from f(x + ε) to take a guess
at cA; then use a larger number of samples to estimate pA;
then simply take pB = 1− pA.
Proposition 2. With probability at least 1 − α over the
randomness in CERTIFY, if CERTIFY returns a class cˆA
and a radius R (i.e. does not abstain), then g predicts cˆA
within radius R around x: g(x+ δ) = cˆA ∀ ‖δ‖2 < R.
The function LOWERCONFBOUND(k, n, 1−α) in the pseu-
docode returns a one-sided (1 − α) lower confidence in-
terval for the Binomial parameter p given a sample k ∼
Binomial(n, p).
Certifying large radii requires many samples Recall
from Theorem 1 that R approaches∞ as pA approaches 1.
Unfortunately, it turns out that pA approaches 1 so slowly
with n that R also approaches∞ very slowly with n. Con-
sider the most favorable situation: f(x) = cA everywhere.
This means that g is robust at radius∞. But after observing
n samples of f(x + ε) which all equal cA, the tightest (to
our knowledge) lower bound would say that with probabil-
ity least 1 − α, pA ≥ α(1/n). Plugging pA = α(1/n) and
pB = 1− pA into (3) yields an expression for the certified
radius as a function of n: R = σΦ−1(α1/n). Figure 5
(right) plots this function for α = 0.001, σ = 1. Observe
that certifying a radius of 4σ with 99.9% confidence would
require ≈ 105 samples.
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Figure 5. Left: Certified radius R as a function of pA (with pB =
1− pA and σ = 1) under all three randomized smoothing bounds.
Right: A plot of R = σΦ−1(α1/n) for α = 0.001 and σ = 1.
The radius we can certify with high probability grows slowly with
the number of samples, even in the best case where f(x) = cA
everywhere.
3.3. Training the base classifier
Theorem 1 holds regardless of how the base classifier f is
trained. However, in order for g to classify the labeled ex-
ample (x, c) correctly and robustly, f needs to consistently
classify N (x, σ2I) as c. In high dimension, the Gaussian
distributionN (x, σ2I) places almost no mass near its mode
x. As a consequence, when σ is moderately high, the distri-
bution of natural images has virtually disjoint support from
the distribution of natural images corrupted by N (0, σ2I);
see Figure 2 for a visual demonstration. Therefore, if the
base classifier f is trained via standard supervised learning
on the data distribution, it will see no noisy images during
training, and hence will not necessarily learn to classify
N (x, σ2I) with x’s true label. Therefore, in this paper we
follow Lecuyer et al. (2019) and train the base classifier
with Gaussian data augmentation at variance σ2. A justifica-
tion for this procedure is provided in Appendix F. However,
we suspect that there may be room to improve upon this
training scheme, perhaps by training the base classifier so
as to maximize the smoothed classifier’s certified accuracy
at some tunable radius r.
4. Experiments
In adversarially robust classification, one metric of interest
is the certified test set accuracy at radius r, defined as the
fraction of the test set which g classifies correctly with a pre-
diction that is certifiably robust within an `2 ball of radius r.
However, if g is a randomized smoothing classifier, comput-
ing this quantity exactly is not possible, so we instead report
the approximate certified test set accuracy, defined as the
fraction of the test set which CERTIFY classifies correctly
(without abstaining) and certifies robust with a radiusR ≥ r.
Appendix D shows how to convert the approximate certified
accuracy into a lower bound on the true certified accuracy
that holds with high probability over the randomness in
CERTIFY. However Appendix H.2 demonstrates that when
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Figure 6. Approximate certified accuracy attained by randomized
smoothing on CIFAR-10 (top) and ImageNet (bottom). The hyper-
parameter σ controls a robustness/accuracy tradeoff. The dashed
black line is an upper bound on the empirical robust accuracy of
an undefended classifier with the base classifier’s architecture.
α is small, the difference between these two quantities is
negligible. Therefore, in our experiments we omit the step
for simplicity and report approximate certified accuracies.
In all experiments, unless otherwise stated, we ran CERTIFY
with α = 0.001, so there was at most a 0.1% chance that
CERTIFY returned a radius in which g was not truly robust.
Unless otherwise stated, when running CERTIFY we used
n0 = 100 Monte Carlo samples for selection and n =
100,000 samples for estimation.
In the figures above that plot certified accuracy as a function
of radius r, the certified accuracy always decreases gradually
with r until reaching some point where it plummets to zero.
This drop occurs because for each noise level σ and number
of samples n, there is a hard upper limit to the radius we can
certify with high probability, achieved when all n samples
are classified by f as the same class.
ImageNet and CIFAR-10 results We applied random-
ized smoothing to CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky, 2009) and Im-
ageNet (Deng et al., 2009). On each dataset we trained
several smoothed classifiers, each with a different σ. On
CIFAR-10 our base classifier was a 110-layer residual
network; certifying each example took 15 seconds on an
NVIDIA RTX 2080 Ti. On ImageNet our base classifier
was a ResNet-50; certifying each example took 110 seconds.
We also trained a neural network with the base classifier’s
architecture on clean data, and subjected it to a DeepFool `2
adversarial attack (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016), in order
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Figure 7. Comparison betwen randomized smoothing and Wong
et al. (2018). Each green line is a small resnet classifier trained and
certified using the method of Wong et al. (2018) with a different
setting of its hyperparameter . The purple line is our method
using the same small resnet architecture as the base classifier;
the blue line is our method with a larger neural network as the
base classifier. Wong et al. (2018) gives deterministic robustness
guarantees, whereas smoothing gives high-probability guaranatees;
therefore, we plot here the certified accuracy of Wong et al. (2018)
against the “approximate” certified accuracy of smoothing.
to obtain an empirical upper bound on its robust accuracy.
We certified the full CIFAR-10 test set and a subsample of
500 examples from the ImageNet test set.
Figure 6 plots the certified accuracy attained by smoothing
with each σ. The dashed black line is the empirical upper
bound on the robust accuracy of the base classifier architec-
ture; observe that smoothing improves substantially upon
the robustness of the undefended base classifier architecture.
We see that σ controls a robustness/accuracy tradeoff. When
σ is low, small radii can be certified with high accuracy, but
large radii cannot be certified. When σ is high, larger radii
can be certified, but smaller radii are certified at a lower ac-
curacy. This observation echoes the finding in Tsipras et al.
(2019) that adversarially trained networks with higher ro-
bust accuracy tend to have lower standard accuracy. Tables
of these results are in Appendix E.
Figure 8 (left) plots the certified accuracy obtained using our
Theorem 1 guarantee alongside the certified accuracy ob-
tained using the analogous bounds of Lecuyer et al. (2019)
and Li et al. (2018). Since our expression for the certified
radius R is greater (and, in fact, tight), our bound delivers
higher certified accuracies. Figure 8 (middle) projects how
the certified accuracy would have changed had CERTIFY
used more or fewer samples n (under the assumption that the
relative class proportions in counts would have remained
constant). Finally, Figure 8 (right) plots the certified accu-
racy as the confidence parameter α is varied. Observe that
the certified accuracy is not very sensitive to α.
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Figure 8. Experiments with randomized smoothing on ImageNet with σ = 0.25. Left: certified accuracies obtained using our Theorem 1
versus those obtained using the robustness guarantees derived in prior work. Middle: projections for the certified accuracy if the number
of samples n used by CERTIFY had been larger or smaller. Right: certified accuracy as the failure probability α of CERTIFY is varied.
Comparison to baselines We compared randomized
smoothing to three baseline approaches for certified `2 ro-
bustness: the duality approach from Wong et al. (2018),
the Lipschitz approach from Tsuzuku et al. (2018), and the
approach from Weng et al. (2018a); Zhang et al. (2018).
The strongest baseline was Wong et al. (2018); we defer the
comparison to the other two baselines to Appendix H.
In Figure 7, we compare the largest publicly released model
from Wong et al. (2018), a small resnet, to two randomized
smoothing classifiers: one which used the same small resnet
architecture for its base classifier, and one which used a
larger 110-layer resnet for its base classifier. First, observe
that smoothing with the large 110-layer resnet substantially
outperforms the baseline (across all hyperparameter set-
tings) at all radii. Second, observe that smoothing with the
small resnet also outperformed the method of Wong et al.
(2018) at all but the smallest radii. We attribute this latter re-
sult to the fact that neural networks trained using the method
of Wong et al. (2018) are “typically overregularized to the
point that many filters/weights become identically zero,” per
that paper. In contrast, the base classifier in randomized
smoothing is a fully expressive neural network.
Prediction It is computationally expensive to certify the
robustness of g around a point x, since the value of n in
CERTIFY must be very large. However, it is far cheaper
to evaluate g at x using PREDICT, since n can be small.
For example, when we ran PREDICT on ImageNet (σ =
0.25) using n = 100, making each prediction only took
0.15 seconds, and we attained a top-1 test accuracy of 65%
(Appendix E).
As discussed earlier, an adversary can potentially force PRE-
DICT to abstain with high probability. However, it is rela-
tively rare for PREDICT to abstain on the actual data dis-
tribution. On ImageNet (σ = 0.25), PREDICT with failure
probability α = 0.001 abstained 12% of the time when n =
100, 4% when n = 1000, and 1% when n = 10,000.
Empirical tightness of bound When f is linear, there al-
ways exists a class-changing perturbation just beyond the
certified radius. Since neural networks are not linear, we em-
pirically assessed the tightness of our bound by subjecting
an ImageNet smoothed classifier (σ = 0.25) to a projected
gradient descent-style adversarial attack (Appendix J.3). For
each example, we ran CERTIFY with α = 0.01, and, if the
example was correctly classified and certified robust at ra-
dius R, we tried finding an adversarial example for g within
radius 1.5R and within radius 2R. We succeeded 17% of
the time at radius 1.5R and 53% of the time at radius 2R.
5. Conclusion
Theorem 2 establishes that smoothing with Gaussian noise
naturally confers adversarial robustness in `2 norm: if we
have no knowledge about the base classifier beyond the dis-
tribution of f(x+ ε), then the set of perturbations to which
the smoothed classifier is provably robust is precisely an `2
ball. We suspect that smoothing with other noise distribu-
tions may lead to similarly natural robustness guarantees for
other perturbation sets such as general `p norm balls.
Our strong empirical results suggest that randomized
smoothing is a promising direction for future research
into adversarially robust classification. Many empirical
approaches have been “broken,” and provable approaches
based on certifying neural network classifiers have not been
shown to scale to networks of modern size. It seems to be
computationally infeasible to reason in any sophisticated
way about the decision boundaries of a large, expressive neu-
ral network. Randomized smoothing circumvents this prob-
lem: the smoothed classifier is not itself a neural network,
though it leverages the discriminative ability of a neural
network base classifier. To make the smoothed classifier ro-
bust, one need simply make the base classifier classify well
under noise. In this way, randomized smoothing reduces the
unsolved problem of adversarially robust classification to
the comparably solved domain of supervised learning.
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A. Proofs of Theorems 1 and 2
Here we provide the complete proofs for Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. We fist prove the following lemma, which is essentially
a restatement of the Neyman-Pearson lemma (Neyman & Pearson, 1933) from statistical hypothesis testing.
Lemma 3 (Neyman-Pearson). Let X and Y be random variables in Rd with densities µX and µY . Let h : Rd → {0, 1}
be a random or deterministic function. Then:
1. If S =
{
z ∈ Rd : µY (z)µX(z) ≤ t
}
for some t > 0 and P(h(X) = 1) ≥ P(X ∈ S), then P(h(Y ) = 1) ≥ P(Y ∈ S).
2. If S =
{
z ∈ Rd : µY (z)µX(z) ≥ t
}
for some t > 0 and P(h(X) = 1) ≤ P(X ∈ S), then P(h(Y ) = 1) ≤ P(Y ∈ S).
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that h is random and write h(1|x) for the probability that h(x) = 1.
First we prove part 1. We denote the complement of S as Sc.
P(h(Y ) = 1)− P(Y ∈ S) =
∫
Rd
h(1|z)µY (z)dz −
∫
S
µY (z)dz
=
[∫
Sc
h(1|z)µY (z)dz +
∫
S
h(1|z)µY (z)dz
]
−
[∫
S
h(1|z)µY (z)dz +
∫
S
h(0|z)µY (z)dz
]
=
∫
Sc
h(1|z)µY (z)dz −
∫
S
h(0|z)µY (z)dz
≥ t
[∫
Sc
h(1|z)µX(z)dz −
∫
S
h(0|z)µX(z)
]
= t
[∫
Sc
h(1|z)µX(z)dz +
∫
S
h(1|z)µX(z)dz −
∫
S
h(1|z)µX(z)dz −
∫
S
h(0|z)µX(z)
]
= t
[∫
Rd
h(1|z)µX(z)dz −
∫
S
µX(z)dz
]
= t [P(h(X) = 1)− P(X ∈ S)]
≥ 0
The inequality in the middle is due to the fact that µY (z) ≤ t µX(z) ∀z ∈ S and µY (z) > tµX(z) ∀z ∈ Sc. The inequality
at the end is because both terms in the product are non-negative by assumption.
The proof for part 2 is virtually identical, except both “≥” become “≤.”
Remark: connection to statistical hypothesis testing. Part 2 of Lemma 3 is known in the field of statistical hypothesis
testing as the Neyman-Pearson Lemma (Neyman & Pearson, 1933). The hypothesis testing problem is this: we are given a
sample that comes from one of two distributions over Rd: either the null distribution X or the alternative distribution Y .
We would like to identify which distribution the sample came from. It is worse to say “Y ” when the true answer is “X”
than to say “X” when the true answer is “Y .” Therefore we seek a (potentially randomized) procedure h : Rd → {0, 1}
which returns “Y ” when the sample really came from X with probability no greater than some failure rate α. In particular,
out of all such rules h, we would like the uniformly most powerful one h∗, i.e. the rule which is most likely to correctly
say “Y ” when the sample really came from Y . Neyman & Pearson (1933) showed that h∗ is the rule which returns “Y ”
deterministically on the set S∗ = {z ∈ Rd : µY (z)µX(z) ≥ t} for whichever t makes P(X ∈ S∗) = α. In other words, to state
this in a form that looks like Part 2 of Lemma 3: if h is a different rule with P(h(X) = 1) ≤ α, then h∗ is more powerful
than h, i.e. P(h(Y ) = 1) ≤ P(Y ∈ S∗).
Now we state the special case of Lemma 3 for when X and Y are isotropic Gaussians.
Lemma 4 (Neyman-Pearson for Gaussians with different means). Let X ∼ N (x, σ2I) and Y ∼ N (x + δ, σ2I). Let
h : Rd → {0, 1} be any deterministic or random function. Then:
1. If S =
{
z ∈ Rd : δT z ≤ β} for some β and P(h(X) = 1) ≥ P(X ∈ S), then P(h(Y ) = 1) ≥ P(Y ∈ S)
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2. If S =
{
z ∈ Rd : δT z ≥ β} for some β and P(h(X) = 1) ≤ P(X ∈ S), then P(h(Y ) = 1) ≤ P(Y ∈ S)
Proof. This lemma is the special case of Lemma 3 when X and Y are isotropic Gaussians with means x and x+ δ.
By Lemma 3 it suffices to simply show that for any β, there is some t > 0 for which:
{z : δT z ≤ β} =
{
z :
µY (z)
µX(z)
≤ t
}
and {z : δT z ≥ β} =
{
z :
µY (z)
µX(z)
≥ t
}
(5)
The likelihood ratio for this choice of X and Y turns out to be:
µY (z)
µX(z)
=
exp
(
− 12σ2
∑d
i=1(zi − (xi + δi))2)
)
exp
(
− 12σ2
∑d
i=1(zi − xi)2
)
= exp
(
1
2σ2
d∑
i=1
2ziδi − δ2i − 2xiδi
)
= exp(aδT z + b)
where a > 0 and b are constants w.r.t z, specifically a = 1σ2 and b =
−(2δT x+‖δ‖2)
2σ2 .
Therefore, given any β we may take t = exp(aβ + b), noticing that
δT z ≤ β ⇐⇒ exp(aδT z + b) ≤ t
δT z ≥ β ⇐⇒ exp(aδT z + b) ≥ t
Finally, we prove Theorem 1 and Theorem 2.
Theorem 1 (restated). Let f : Rd → Y be any deterministic or random function. Let ε ∼ N (0, σ2I). Let g(x) =
arg maxc P(f(x+ ε) = c). Suppose that for a specific x ∈ Rd, there exist cA ∈ Y and pA, pB ∈ [0, 1] such that:
P(f(x+ ε) = cA) ≥ pA ≥ pB ≥ max
c 6=cA
P(f(x+ ε) = c) (6)
Then g(x+ δ) = cA for all ‖δ‖2 < R, where
R =
σ
2
(Φ−1(pA)− Φ−1(pB)) (7)
Proof. To show that g(x+ δ) = cA, it follows from the definition of g that we need to show that
P(f(x+ δ + ε) = cA) > max
cB 6=cA
P(f(x+ δ + ε) = cB)
We will prove that P(f(x+ δ+ ε) = cA) > P(f(x+ δ+ ε) = cB) for every class cB 6= cA. Fix one such class cB without
loss of generality.
For brevity, define the random variables
X := x+ ε = N (x, σ2I)
Y := x+ δ + ε = N (x+ δ, σ2I)
In this notation, we know from (6) that
P(f(X) = cA) ≥ pA and P(f(X) = cB) ≤ pB (8)
Certified Adversarial Robustness via Randomized Smoothing
x+ δ
x
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x
Figure 9. Illustration of the proof of Theorem 1. The solid line concentric circles are the density level sets of X := x+ ε; the dashed
line concentric circles are the level sets of Y := x+ δ + ε. The set A is in blue and the set B is in red. The figure on the left depicts
a situation where P(Y ∈ A) > P(Y ∈ B), and hence g(x + δ) may equal cA. The figure on the right depicts a situation where
P(Y ∈ A) < P(Y ∈ B) and hence g(x+ δ) 6= cA.
and our goal is to show that
P(f(Y ) = cA) > P(f(Y ) = cB) (9)
Define the half-spaces:
A := {z : δT (z − x) ≤ σ‖δ‖Φ−1(pA)}
B := {z : δT (z − x) ≥ σ‖δ‖Φ−1(1− pB)}
Algebra (deferred to the end) shows that P(X ∈ A) = pA. Therefore, by (8) we know that P(f(X) = cA) ≥ P(X ∈ A).
Hence we may apply Lemma 4 with h(z) := 1[f(z) = cA] to conclude:
P(f(Y ) = cA) ≥ P(Y ∈ A) (10)
Similarly, algebra shows that P(X ∈ B) = pB . Therefore, by (8) we know that P(f(X) = cB) ≤ P(X ∈ B). Hence we
may apply Lemma 4 with h(z) := 1[f(z) = cB ] to conclude:
P(f(Y ) = cB) ≤ P(Y ∈ B) (11)
To guarantee (9), we see from (10, 11) that it suffices to show that P(Y ∈ A) > P(Y ∈ B), as this step completes the chain
of inequalities
P(f(Y ) = cA) ≥ P(Y ∈ A) > P(Y ∈ B) ≥ P(f(Y ) = cB) (12)
We can compute the following:
P(Y ∈ A) = Φ
(
Φ−1(pA)− ‖δ‖
σ
)
(13)
P(Y ∈ B) = Φ
(
Φ−1(pB) +
‖δ‖
σ
)
(14)
Finally, algebra shows that P(Y ∈ A) > P(Y ∈ B) if and only if:
‖δ‖ < σ
2
(Φ−1(pA)− Φ−1(pB)) (15)
which recovers the theorem statement.
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We now restate and prove Theorem 2, which shows that the bound in Theorem 1 is tight. The assumption below in Theorem
2 that pA + pB ≤ 1 is mild: given any pA and pB which do not satisfy this condition, one could have always redefined
pB ← 1 − pA to obtain a Theorem 1 guarantee with a larger certified radius, so there is no reason to invoke Theorem 1
unless pA + pB ≤ 1.
Theorem 2 (restated). Assune pA + pB ≤ 1. For any perturbation δ ∈ Rd with ‖δ‖2 > R, there exists a base classifier f∗
consistent with the observed class probabilities (6) such that if f∗ is the base classifier for g, then g(x+ δ) 6= cA.
Proof. We re-use notation from the preceding proof.
Pick any class cB arbitrarily. Define A and B as above, and consider the function
f∗(x) :=

cA if x ∈ A
cB if x ∈ B
other classes otherwise
This function is well-defined, since A ∩B = ∅ provided that pA + pB ≤ 1.
By construction, the function f∗ satisfies (6) with equalities, since
P(f∗(x+ ε) = cA) = P(X ∈ A) = pA P(f∗(x+ ε) = cB) = P(X ∈ B) = pB
It follows from (13) and (14) that
P(Y ∈ A) < P(Y ∈ B) ⇐⇒ ‖δ‖2 > R
By assumption, ‖δ‖2 > R, so P(Y ∈ A) < P(Y ∈ B), or equivalently,
P(f∗(x+ δ + ε) = cA) < P(f∗(x+ δ + ε) = cB)
Therefore, if f∗ is the base classifier for g, then g(x+ δ) 6= cA.
A.0.1. DEFERRED ALGEBRA
Claim. P(X ∈ A) = pA
Proof. Recall that X ∼ N (x, σ2I) and A = {z : δT (z − x) ≤ σ‖δ‖Φ−1(pA)}.
P(X ∈ A) = P(δT (X − x) ≤ σ‖δ‖Φ−1(pA))
= P(δTN (0, σ2I) ≤ σ‖δ‖Φ−1(pA))
= P(σ‖δ‖Z ≤ σ‖δ‖Φ−1(pA)) (Z ∼ N (0, 1))
= Φ(Φ−1(pA))
= pA
Claim. P(X ∈ B) = pB
Proof. Recall that X ∼ N (x, σ2I) and B = {z : δT (z − x) ≤ σ‖δ‖Φ−1(1− pB)}.
P(X ∈ A) = P(δT (X − x) ≥ σ‖δ‖Φ−1(1− pB))
= P(δTN (0, σ2I) ≥ σ‖δ‖Φ−1(1− pB))
= P(σ‖δ‖Z ≥ σ‖δ‖Φ−1(1− pB)) (Z ∼ N (0, 1))
= P(Z ≥ Φ−1(1− pB))
= 1− Φ(Φ−1(1− pB))
= pB
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Claim. P(Y ∈ A) = Φ
(
Φ−1(pA)− ‖δ‖σ
)
Proof. Recall that Y ∼ N (x+ δ, σ2I) and A = {z : δT (z − x) ≤ σ‖δ‖Φ−1(pA)}.
P(Y ∈ A) = P(δT (Y − x) ≤ σ‖δ‖Φ−1(pA))
= P(δTN (0, σ2I) + ‖δ‖2 ≤ σ‖δ‖Φ−1(pA))
= P(σ‖δ‖Z ≤ σ‖δ‖Φ−1(pA)− ‖δ‖2) (Z ∼ N (0, 1))
= P
(
Z ≤ Φ−1(pA)− ‖δ‖
σ
)
= Φ
(
Φ−1(pA)− ‖δ‖
σ
)
Claim. P(Y ∈ B) = Φ
(
Φ−1(pB) +
‖δ‖
σ
)
Proof. Recall that Y ∼ N (x+ δ, σ2I) and B = {z : δT (z − x) ≥ σ‖δ‖Φ−1(1− pB)}.
P(Y ∈ B) = P(δT (Y − x) ≥ σ‖δ‖Φ−1(1− pB))
= P(δTN (0, σ2I) + ‖δ‖2 ≥ σ‖δ‖Φ−1(1− pB))
= P(σ‖δ‖Z + ‖δ‖2 ≥ σ‖δ‖Φ−1(1− pB)) (Z ∼ N (0, 1))
= P
(
Z ≥ Φ−1(1− pB)− ‖δ‖
σ
)
= P
(
Z ≤ Φ−1(pB) + ‖δ‖
σ
)
= Φ
(
Φ−1(pB) +
‖δ‖
σ
)
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B. Smoothing a two-class linear classifier
In this appendix, we analyze what happens when the base classifier f is a two-class linear classifier f(x) = sign(wTx+ b).
To match the definition of g, we take sign(·) to be undefined when its argument is zero.
x
x
Figure 10. Illustration of Proposition 3. A binary linear classifier f(x) = sign(wTx+ b) partitions Rd into two half-spaces, drawn here
in blue and red. An isotropic Gaussian N (x, σ2I) will put more mass on whichever half-space its center x lies in: in the figure on
the left, x is in the blue half-space and N (x, σ2I) puts more mass on the blue than on red. In the figure on the right, x is in the red
half-space andN (x, σ2I) puts more mass on red than on blue. Since the smoothed classifier’s prediction g(x) is defined to be whichever
half-spaceN (x, σ2I) puts more mass in, and the base classifier’s prediction f(x) is defined to be whichever half-space x is in, we have
that g(x) = f(x) for all x.
Our first result is that when f is a two-class linear classifier, the smoothed classifier g is identical to the base classifier f .
Proposition 3. If f is a two-class linear classifier f(x) = sign(wTx+ b), and g is the smoothed version of f with any σ,
then g(x) = f(x) for any x (where f is defined).
Proof. From the definition of g,
g(x) = 1 ⇐⇒ Pε(f(x+ ε) = 1) > 1
2
(ε ∼ N (0, σ2I))
⇐⇒ Pε
(
sign(wT (x+ ε) + b) = 1
)
>
1
2
⇐⇒ Pε
(
wTx+ wT ε+ b ≥ 0) > 1
2
⇐⇒ P (σ‖w‖Z ≥ −wTx− b) > 1
2
(Z ∼ N (0, 1))
⇐⇒ P
(
Z ≤ w
Tx+ b
σ‖w‖
)
>
1
2
⇐⇒ w
Tx+ b
σ‖w‖ > 0
⇐⇒ wTx+ b > 0
⇐⇒ f(x) = 1
A similar calculation shows that g(x) = −1 ⇐⇒ f(x) = −1.
A two-class linear classifier f(x) = sign(wTx + b) is already certifiable: the distance from any point x to the decision
boundary is (wTx+b)/‖w‖2, and no distance with `2 norm strictly less than this distance can possibly change f ’s prediction.
Let g be a smoothed version of f . By Proposition 3, g is identical to f , so it follows that g is truly robust around any
input x within the `2 radius (wTx+ b)/‖w‖2. We now show that Theorem 1 will certify this radius, rather than a smaller,
over-conservative radius.
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Proposition 4. If f is a two-class linear classifier f(x) = sign(wTx + b), and g is the smoothed version of f with any
σ, then invoking Theorem 1 at any x (where f is defined) with pA = pA and pB = pB will yield the certified radius
R = |w
T x+b|
‖w‖ .
Proof. In binary classification, pA = 1− pB , so Theorem 1 returns R = σΦ−1(pA).
We have:
pA = Pε(f(x+ ε) = g(x))
= Pε(sign(wT (x+ ε) + b) = sign(wTx+ b)) (By Proposition 3, g(x) = f(x))
= Pε(sign(wTx+ σ‖w‖Z + b) = sign(wTx+ b))
There are two cases: if wTx+ b > 0, then
pA = Pε(wTx+ σ‖w‖Z + b > 0)
= Pε
(
Z >
−wTx− b
σ‖w‖
)
= Pε
(
Z <
wTx+ b
σ‖w‖
)
= Φ
(
wTx+ b
σ‖w‖
)
On the other hand, if wTx+ b < 0, then
pA = Pε(wTx+ σ‖w‖Z + b < 0)
= Pε
(
Z <
−wTx− b
σ‖w‖
)
= Φ
(−wTx− b
σ‖w‖
)
In either case, we have:
pA = Φ
( |wTx+ b|
σ‖w‖
)
Therefore, the bound in Theorem 1 returns a radius of
R = σΦ−1(pA)
=
|wTx+ b|
‖w‖
The previous two propositions imply that when f is a two-class linear classifier, the Theorem 1 bound is “tight” in the sense
that there always exists a class-changing perturbation just beyond the certified radius.3
Proposition 5. Let f be a two-class linear classifier f(x) = sign(wTx+ b), let g be the smoothed version of f for some σ,
let x be any point (where f is defined), and let R be the radius certified around x by Theorem 1. Then for any radius r > R,
there exists a perturbation δ with ‖δ‖2 = r for which g(x+ δ) 6= g(x).
3Note that this is a different sense of “tight” than the sense in which Theorem 2 proves that Theorem 1 is tight. Theorem 2 proves that
for any fixed perturbation δ outside the radius certified by Theorem 1, there exists a base classifier f for which g(x + δ) 6= g(x). In
contrast, Proposition 5 proves that for any fixed binary linear base classifier f , there exists a perturbation δ just outside the radius certified
by Theorem 1 for which g(x+ δ) 6= g(x).
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Proof. By Proposition 3 it suffices to show that there exists some perturbation δ with ‖δ‖2 = r for which f(x+ δ) 6= f(x).
By Proposition 4, we know that R = |w
T x+b|
‖w‖2 .
If wTx+ b > 0, consider the perturbation δ = − w‖w‖2 r. This perturbation satisfies ‖δ‖2 = r and
wT (x+ δ) + b = wTx+ b+ wT δ
= wTx+ b− ‖w‖2r
< wTx+ b− ‖w‖2R
= wTx+ b− |wTx+ b|
= wTx+ b− (wTx+ b)
= 0
implying that f(x+ δ) = −1.
Likewise, ifwTx+b < 0, then consider the perturbation δ = w‖w‖2 r. This perturbation satisfies ‖δ‖2 = r and f(x+δ) = −1.
x x
x+ δ
Figure 11. Left: Illustration of of Proposition 4. The red/blue half-spaces are the decision regions of both the base classifier f and the
smoothed classifier g. (Since the base classifier is binary linear, g = f everywhere.) The black circle is the robustness radiusR certified by
Theorem 1. Right: Illustration of Proposition 5. For any r > R, there exists a perturbation δ with ‖δ‖2 = r for which g(x+ δ) 6= g(x).
This special property of two-class linear classifiers is not true in general. In fact, it is possible to construct situations where
g’s prediction around some point x0 is robust at radius∞, yet Theorem 1 only certifies a radius of τ , where τ is arbitrarily
close to zero.
Proposition 6. For any τ > 0, there exists a base classifier f and an input x0 for which the corresponding smoothed
classifier g is robust around x0 at radius∞, yet Theorem 1 only certifies a radius of τ around x0.
Proof. Let t = −Φ−1( 12Φ(τ)) and consider the following base classifier:
f(x) =

1 if x < −t
−1 if − t ≤ x ≤ t
1 if x > t
Let g be the smoothed version of f with σ = 1. We will show that g(x) = 1 everywhere, implying that g’s prediction is
robust around x0 = 0 with radius∞. Yet Theorem 1 only certifies a radius of τ around x0.
Certified Adversarial Robustness via Randomized Smoothing
Let Z ∼ N (0, 1). For any x, we have:
P(f(x+ ε) = −1) = P(−t ≤ x+ ε ≤ t)
= P[−t− x ≤ Z ≤ t− x]
≤ P[−t ≤ Z ≤ t] (apply Lemma 5 below with ` = −t− x)
= 1− 2Φ(−t)
= 1− Φ(τ)
<
1
2
.
Therefore, g(x) = 1 for all x.
Meanwhile, at x0 = 0, we have:
P(f(x0 + ε) = 1) = P(f(ε) = 1)
= P(Z < −t or Z > t)
= 2Φ(−t)
= Φ(τ),
so by Theorem 1, the certified radius around x0 is R = τ .
The proof of Proposition 6 employed the following lemma, which formalizes the visually obvious fact that out of all intervals
of some fixed width 2t, the interval with maximal mass under the standard normal distribution Z is the interval [−t, t].
Lemma 5. Let Z ∼ N (0, 1). For any ` ∈ R, t > 0, we have P(` ≤ Z ≤ `+ 2t) ≤ P(−t ≤ Z ≤ t).
Proof. Let φ be the PDF of the standard normal distribution. Since φ is symmetric about the origin (i.e. φ(x) = φ(−x) ∀x),
P(−t ≤ Z ≤ t) = 2
∫ t
0
φ(x)dx.
There are two cases to consider:
Case 1: The interval [`, `+ 2t] is entirely positive, i.e. ` ≥ 0, or [`, `+ 2t] is entirely negative, i.e. `+ 2t ≤ 0.
First, we use the fact that φ is symmetric about the origin to rewrite P(` ≤ Z ≤ `+ 2t) as the probability that Z falls in a
non-negative interval [a, a+ 2t] for some a.
Specifically, if ` ≥ 0, then let a = `. Else, if `+ 2t ≤ 0, then let a = −(`+ 2t). We therefore have:
P(` ≤ Z ≤ `+ 2t) = P(a ≤ Z ≤ a+ 2t).
Therefore:
P(−t ≤ Z ≤ t)− P(` ≤ Z ≤ `+ 2t) =
∫ t
0
φ(x)dx−
∫ a+t
a
φ(x)dx+
∫ t
0
φ(x)dx−
∫ a+2t
a+t
φ(x)dx
=
∫ a+t
a
φ(x− a)dx−
∫ a+t
a
φ(x)dx+
∫ a+2t
a+t
φ(x− a− t)dx−
∫ a+2t
a+t
φ(x)dx
=
∫ a+t
a
[φ(x− a)− φ(x)] dx+
∫ a+2t
a+t
[φ(x− a− t)− φ(x)] dx
≥
∫ a+t
a
0 dx+
∫ a+2t
a+t
0 dx
= 0
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where the inequality is because φ is monotonically decreasing on [0,∞).
Case 2: I is partly positive, partly negative, i.e. ` < 0 < `+ 2t.
First, we use the fact that φ is symmetric about the origin to rewrite P(` ≤ Z ≤ `+ 2t) as the sum of the probabilities that
Z falls in two non-negative intervals [0, a] and [0, b] for some a, b.
Specifically, let a = min(−`, `+ 2t) and b = max(−`, `+ 2t). We therefore have:
P(` ≤ Z ≤ `+ 2t) = P(0 ≤ Z ≤ a) + P(0 ≤ Z ≤ b).
Note that by construction, a+ b = 2t, and 0 ≤ a ≤ t and t ≤ b ≤ 2t.
We have:
P(−t ≤ Z ≤ t)− P(` ≤ Z ≤ `+ 2t) =
(∫ t
0
φ(x)dx−
∫ a
0
φ(x)dx
]
−
[∫ b
0
φ(x)dx−
∫ t
0
φ(x)dx
)
=
∫ t
a
φ(x)dx−
∫ b
t
φ(x)dx
=
∫ t
a
φ(x)dx−
∫ 2t−a
t
φ(x)dx
=
∫ t
a
φ(x)dx−
∫ t
a
φ(x− a+ t)dx
=
∫ t
a
(φ(x)− φ(x− a+ t))dx
≥
∫ t
a
0 dx
= 0
where the inequality is again because φ is monotonically decreasing on [0,∞).
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C. Practical algorithms
In this appendix, we elaborate on the prediction and certification algorithms described in Section 3.2. The pseudocode in
Section 3.2 makes use of several helper functions:
• SAMPLEUNDERNOISE(f , x, num, σ) works as follows:
1. Draw num samples of noise, ε1 . . . εnum ∼ N (0, σ2I).
2. Run the noisy images through the base classifier f to obtain the predictions f(x+ ε1), . . . , f(x+ εnum).
3. Return the counts for each class, where the count for class c is defined as
∑num
i=1 1[f(x+ εi) = c].
• BINOMPVALUE(nA, nA+nB , p) returns the p-value of the two-sided hypothesis test that nA ∼ Binomial(nA+nB , p).
Using scipy.stats.binom test, this can be implemented as: binom test(nA, nA + nB, p).
• LOWERCONFBOUND(k, n, 1 − α) returns a one-sided (1 − α) lower confidence interval for the Binomial pa-
rameter p given that k ∼ Binomial(n, p). In other words, it returns some number p for which p ≤ p with prob-
ability at least 1 − α over the sampling of k ∼ Binomial(n, p). Following Lecuyer et al. (2019), we chose to
use the Clopper-Pearson confidence interval, which inverts the Binomial CDF (Clopper & Pearson, 1934). Using
statsmodels.stats.proportion.proportion confint, this can be implemented as
proportion_confint(k, n, alpha=2*alpha, method="beta")[0]
C.1. Prediction
The randomized algorithm given in pseudocode as PREDICT leverages the hypothesis test given in Hung & Fithian (2019)
for identifying the top category of a multinomial distribution. PREDICT has one tunable hyperparameter, α. When α is small,
PREDICT abstains frequently but rarely returns the wrong class. When α is large, PREDICT usually makes a prediction, but
may often return the wrong class.
We now prove that with high probability, PREDICT will either return g(x) or abstain.
Proposition 1 (restated). With probability at least 1− α over the randomness in PREDICT, PREDICT will either abstain
or return g(x). (Equivalently: the probability that PREDICT returns a class other than g(x) is at most α.)
Proof. For notational convenience, define pc = P(f(x+ ε) = c). Let cA = maxc pc. Notice that by definition, g(x) = cA.
We can describe the randomized procedure PREDICT as follows:
1. Sample a vector of class counts {nc}c∈Y from Multinomial({pc}c∈Y , n).
2. Let cˆA = arg maxc nc be the class whose count is largest. Let nA and nB be the largest count and the second-largest
count, respectively.
3. If the p-value of the two-sided hypothesis test that nA is drawn from Binom
(
nA + nB ,
1
2
)
is less than α, then return
cˆA. Else, abstain.
The quantities cA and the pc’s are fixed but unknown, while the quantities cˆA, the nc’s, nA, and nB are random.
We’d like to prove that the probability that PREDICT returns a class other than cA is at most α. PREDICT returns a class
other than cA if and only if (1) cˆA 6= cA and (2) PREDICT does not abstain.
We have:
P(PREDICT returns class 6= cA) = P(cˆA 6= cA, PREDICT does not abstain)
= P(cˆA 6= cA) P(PREDICT does not abstain|cˆA 6= cA)
≤ P(PREDICT does not abstain|cˆA 6= cA)
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Recall that PREDICT does not abstain if and only if the p-value of the two-sided hypothesis test that nA is drawn from
Binom(nA + nB , 12 ) is less than α. Theorem 1 in Hung & Fithian (2019) proves that the conditional probability that this
event occurs given that cˆA 6= cA is exactly α. That is,
P(PREDICT does not abstain|cˆA 6= cA) = α
Therefore, we have:
P(PREDICT returns class 6= cA) ≤ α
C.2. Certification
The certification task is: given some input x and a randomized smoothing classifier described by (f, σ), return both (1) the
prediction g(x) and (2) a radius R in which this prediction is certified robust. This task requires identifying the class cA
with maximal weight in f(x+ ε), estimating a lower bound pA on pA := P(f(x+ ε) = cA) and estimating an upper bound
pB on pB := maxc 6=cA P(f(x+ ε) = c) (Figure 1).
Suppose for simplicity that we already knew cA and needed to obtain pA. We could collect n samples of f(x+ ε), count
how many times f(x + ε) = cA, and use a Binomial confidence interval to obtain a lower bound on pA that holds with
probability at least 1− α over the n samples.
However, estimating pA and pB while simultaneously identifying the top class cA is a little bit tricky, statistically speaking.
We propose a simple two-step procedure. First, use n0 samples from f(x+ ε) to take a guess cˆA at the identity of the top
class cA. In practice we observed that f(x+ ε) tends to put most of its weight on the top class, so n0 can be set very small.
Second, use n samples from f(x+ ε) to obtain some pA and pB for which pA ≤ pA and pB ≥ pB with probability at least
1− α. We observed that it is much more typical for the mass of f(x+ ε) not allocated to cA to be allocated entirely to one
runner-up class than to be allocated uniformly over all remaining classes. Therefore, the quantity 1− pA is a reasonably
tight upper bound on pB . Hence, we simply set pB = 1− pA, so our bound becomes
R =
σ
2
(Φ−1(pA)− Φ−1(1− pA))
=
σ
2
(Φ−1(pA) + Φ−1(pA))
= σΦ−1(pA)
The full procedure is described in pseudocode as CERTIFY. If pA < 12 , we abstain from making a certification; this can
occur especially if cˆA 6= g(x), i.e. if we misidentify the top class using the first n0 samples of f(x+ ε).
Proposition 2 (restated). With probability at least 1− α over the randomness in CERTIFY, if CERTIFY returns a class cˆA
and a radius R (i.e. does not abstain), then we have the robustness guarantee
g(x+ δ) = cˆA whenever ‖δ‖2 < R
Proof. From the contract of LOWERCONFBOUND, we know that with probability at least 1 − α over the sampling of
ε1 . . . εn, we have pA ≤ P[f(x+ ε) = cˆA]. Notice that CERTIFY returns a class and radius only if pA > 12 (otherwise it
abstains). If pA ≤ P[f(x+ ε) = cˆA] and 12 < pA, then we can invoke Theorem 1 with pB = 1− pA to obtain the desired
guarantee.
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D. Estimating the certified test-set accuracy
In this appendix, we show how to convert the “approximate certified test accuracy” considered in the main paper into a
lower bound on the true certified test accuracy that holds with high probability over the randomness in CERTIFY.
Consider a classifier g, a test set S = {(x1, c1) . . . (xm, cm)}, and a radius r. For each example i ∈ [m], let zi indicate
whether g’s prediction at xi is both correct and robust at radius r, i.e.
zi = 1[g(xi + δ) = ci ∀‖δ‖2 < r]
The certified test set accuracy of g at radius r is defined as 1m
∑m
i=1 zi. If g is a randomized smoothing classifier, we cannot
compute this quantity exactly, but we can estimate a lower bound that holds with arbitrarily high probability over the
randomness in CERTIFY. In particular, suppose that we run CERTIFY with failure rate α on each example xi in the test set.
Let the Bernoulli random variable Yi denote the event that on example i, CERTIFY returns the correct label cA = ci and a
certified radius R which is greater than r. Let Y =
∑m
i=1 Yi. In the main paper, we referred to Y/m as the “approximate
certified accuracy.” It is “approximate” because Yi = 1 does not mean that zi = 1. Rather, from Proposition 2, we know
the following: if zi = 0, then P(Yi = 1) ≤ α. We now show how to exploit this fact to construct a one-sided confidence
interval for the unobserved quantity 1m
∑m
i=1 zi using the observed quantities Y and m.
Theorem 6. For any ρ > 0, with probability at least 1− ρ over the randomness in CERTIFY,
1
m
m∑
i=1
zi ≥ 1
1− α
(
Y
m
− α−
√
2α(1− α) log(1/ρ)
m
− log(1/ρ)
3m
)
(16)
Proof. Let mgood =
∑m
i=1 zi and mbad =
∑m
i=1(1 − zi) be the number of test examples on which zi = 1 or zi = 0,
respectively. We model Yi ∼ Bernoulli(pi), where pi is in general unknown. Let Ygood =
∑
i:zi=1
Yi and Ybad =
∑
i:zi=0
Yi.
The quantity of interest, the certified accuracy 1m
∑m
i=1 zi, is equal tomgood/m. However, we only observe Y = Ygood +Ybad.
Note that if zi = 0, then pi ≤ α, so we have E[Yi] = pi ≤ α and assuming α ≤ 12 , we have Var[Yi] = pi(1−pi) ≤ α(1−α).
Since Ybad is a sum of mbad independent random variables each bounded between zero and one, with E[Ybad] ≤ αmbad and
Var(Ybad) ≤ mbadα(1− α), Bernstein’s inequality (Blanchard, 2007) guarantees that with probability at least 1− ρ over the
randomness in CERTIFY,
Ybad ≤ αmbad +
√
2mbadα(1− α) log(1/ρ) + log(1/ρ)
3
From now on, we manipulate this inequality — remember that it holds with probability at least 1− ρ.
Since Y = Ygood + Ybad, may write
Ygood ≥ Y − αmbad −
√
2mbadα(1− α) log(1/ρ)− log(1/ρ)
3
Since mgood ≥ Ygood, we may write
mgood ≥ Y − αmbad −
√
2mbadα(1− α) log(1/ρ)− log(1/ρ)
3
Since mgood +mbad = m, we may write
mgood ≥ 1
1− α
(
Y − αm−
√
2mbadα(1− α) log(1/ρ)− log(1/ρ)
3
)
Finally, in order to make this confidence interval depend only on observables, we use mbad ≤ m to write
mgood ≥ 1
1− α
(
Y − αm−
√
2mα(1− α) log(1/ρ)− log(1/ρ)
3
)
Dividing both sides of the inequality by m recovers the theorem statement.
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E. ImageNet and CIFAR-10 Results
E.1. Certification
Tables 2 and 3 show the approximate certified top-1 test set accuracy of randomized smoothing on ImageNet and CIFAR-10
with various noise levels σ. By “approximate certified accuracy,” we mean that we ran CERTIFY on a subsample of the
test set, and for each r we report the fraction of examples on which CERTIFY (a) did not abstain, (b) returned the correct
class, and (c) returned a radius R greater than r. There is some probability (at most α) that any example’s certification is
inaccurate. We used α = 0.001 and n = 100000. On CIFAR-10 our base classifier was a 110-layer residual network and
we certified the full test set; on ImageNet our base classifier was a ResNet-50 and we certified a subsample of 500 points.
Note that the certified accuracy at r = 0 is just the standard accuracy of the smoothed classifier. See Appendix J for more
experimental details.
r = 0.0 r = 0.5 r = 1.0 r = 1.5 r = 2.0 r = 2.5 r = 3.0
σ = 0.25 0.67 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
σ = 0.50 0.57 0.46 0.37 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00
σ = 1.00 0.44 0.38 0.33 0.26 0.19 0.15 0.12
Table 2. Approximate certified test accuracy on ImageNet. Each row is a setting of the hyperparameter σ, each column is an `2 radius.
The entry of the best σ for each radius is bolded. For comparison, random guessing would attain 0.001 accuracy.
r = 0.0 r = 0.25 r = 0.5 r = 0.75 r = 1.0 r = 1.25 r = 1.5
σ = 0.12 0.83 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
σ = 0.25 0.77 0.61 0.42 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00
σ = 0.50 0.66 0.55 0.43 0.32 0.22 0.14 0.08
σ = 1.00 0.47 0.41 0.34 0.28 0.22 0.17 0.14
Table 3. Approximate certified test accuracy on CIFAR-10. Each row is a setting of the hyperparameter σ, each column is an `2 radius.
The entry of the best σ for each radius is bolded. For comparison, random guessing would attain 0.1 accuracy.
E.2. Prediction
Table 4 shows the performance of PREDICT as the number of Monte Carlo samples n is varied between 100 and 10,000.
Suppose that for some test example (x, c), PREDICT returns the label cˆA. We say that this prediction was correct if cˆA = c
and we say that this prediction was accurate if cˆA = g(x). For example, a prediction could be correct but inaccurate if g is
wrong at x, yet PREDICT accidentally returns the correct class. Ideally, we’d like PREDICT to be both correct and accurate.
With n = 100 Monte Carlo samples and a failure rate of α = 0.001, PREDICT is cheap to evaluate (0.15 seconds on our
hardware) yet it attains relatively high top-1 accuracy of 65% on the ImageNet test set, and only abstains 12% of the time.
When we use n = 10,000 Monte Carlo samples, PREDICT takes longer to evaluate (15 seconds), yet only abstains 4% of the
time. Interestingly, we observe from Table 4 that most of the abstentions when n = 100 were for examples on which g was
wrong, so in practice we would lose little accuracy by taking n to be as small as 100.
CORRECT, ACCURATE CORRECT, INACCURATE INCORRECT, ACCURATE INCORRECT, INACCURATE ABSTAIN
N
100 0.65 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.12
1000 0.68 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.04
10000 0.69 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.01
Table 4. Performance of PRECICT as n is varied. The dataset was ImageNet and σ = 0.25, α = 0.001. Each column shows the fraction
of test examples which ended up in one of five categories; the prediction at x is “correct” if PREDICT returned the true label, while the
prediction is “accurate” if PREDICT returned g(x). Computing g(x) exactly is not possible, so in order to determine whether PREDICT
was accurate, we took the gold standard to be the top class over n =100,000 Monte Carlo samples.
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F. Training with Noise
As mentioned in section 3.3, in the experiments for this paper, we followed Lecuyer et al. (2019) and trained the base
classifier by minimizing the cross-entropy loss with Gaussian data augmentation. We now provide some justification for this
idea.
Let {(x1, c1), . . . , (xn, cn)} be a training dataset. We assume that the base classifier takes the form f(x) =
arg maxc∈Y fc(x), where each fc is the scoring function for class c.
Suppose that our goal is to maximize the sum of of the log-probabilities that f will classify each xi + ε as ci:
n∑
i=1
logPε(f(xi + ε) = ci) =
n∑
i=1
logEε 1
[
arg max
c
fc(xi + ε) = ci
]
(17)
Recall that the softmax function can be interpreted as a continuous, differentiable approximation to arg max:
1
[
arg max
c
fc(xi + ε) = ci
]
≈ exp(fci(xi + ε))∑
c∈Y exp(fc(xi + ε))
Therefore, our objective is approximately equal to:
n∑
i=1
logEε
[
exp(fci(xi + ε))∑
c∈Y exp(fc(xi + ε))
]
(18)
By Jensen’s inequality and the concavity of log, this quantity is lower-bounded by:
n∑
i=1
Eε
[
log
exp(fci(xi + ε))∑
c∈Y exp(fc(xi + ε))
]
which is the negative of the cross-entropy loss under Gaussian data augmentation.
Therefore, minimizing the cross-entropy loss under Gaussian data augmentation will maximize (18), which will approxi-
mately maximize (17).
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G. Noise Level can Scale with Input Resolution
Since our robustness guarantee (3) in Theorem 1 does not explicitly depend on the data dimension d, one might worry that
randomized smoothing is less effective for images in high resolution — certifying a fixed `2 radius is “less impressive” for,
say, 224 × 224 image than for a 56 × 56 image. However, it turns out that in high resolution, images can be corrupted
with larger levels of isotropic Gaussian noise while still preserving their content. This fact is made clear by Figure 12,
which shows an image at high and low resolution corrupted by Gaussian noise with the same variance.full The class
(“hummingbird”) is easy to discern from the high-resolution noisy image, but not from the low-resolution noisy image. As a
consequence, in high resolution one can take σ to be larger while still being able to obtain a base classifier that classifies
noisy images accurately. Since our Theorem 1 robustness guarantee scales linearly with σ, this means that in high resolution
one can certify larger radii.
Figure 12. Top: An ImageNet image from class “hummingbird” in resolutions 56x56 (left) and 224x224 (right). Bottom: the same
images corrupted by isotropic Gaussian noise at σ = 0.5. On noiseless images the class is easy to distinguish no matter the resolution, but
on noisy data the class is much easier to distinguish when the resolution is high.
The argument above can be made rigorous, though we first need to decide what it means for two images to be high- and
low-resolution versions of each other. Here we present one solution:
LetX denote the space of “high-resolution” images in dimension 2k×2k×3, and letX ′ denote the space of “low-resolution”
images in dimension k × k × 3. Let AVGPOOL : X → X ′ be the function which takes as input an image x in dimension
2k × 2k × 3, averages together every 2x2 square of pixels, and outputs an image in dimension k × k × 3.
Equipped with these definitions, we can say that (x, x′) ∈ X ×X ′ are a high/low resolution image pair if x′ = AVGPOOL(x).
Proposition 7. Given any smoothing classifier g′ : X ′ → Y , one can construct a smoothing classifier g : X → Y with
the following property: for any x ∈ X and x′ = AVGPOOL(x), g predicts the same class at x that g′ predicts at x′, but is
certifiably robust at twice the radius.
Proof. Given some smoothing classifier g′ = (f ′, σ′) from X ′ to Y , define g to be the smoothing classifier (f, σ) from X
to Y with noise level σ = 2σ′ and base classifier f(x) = f ′(AVGPOOL(x)). Note that the average of four independent
copies of N (0, (2σ)2) is distributed as N (0, σ2). Therefore, for any high/low-resolution image pair x′ = AVGPOOL(x),
the random variable AVGPOOL(x+ ε), where ε ∼ N (0, (2σ)2I2k×2k×3), is equal in distribution to the random variable
x′ + ε′, where ε′ ∼ N (0, σ2Ik×k×3). Hence, f(x+ ε) = f ′(AVGPOOL(x+ ε)) has the same distribution as f ′(x′ + ε′).
By the definition of g, this means that g(x) = g′(x′), Additionally, by Theorem 1, since σ = 2σ′, this means that g’s
prediction at x is certifiably robust at twice the radius as g′’s prediction at x′.
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H. Additional Experiments
H.1. Comparisons to baselines
Figure 13 compares the certified accuracy of a smoothed 20-layer resnet to that of the released models from two recent works
on certified `2 robustness: the Lipschitz approach from Tsuzuku et al. (2018) and the approach from Zhang et al. (2018).
Note that in these experiments, the base classifier for smoothing was larger than the networks of competing approaches. The
comparison to Zhang et al. (2018) is on CIFAR-10, while the comparison to Tsuzuku et al. (2018) is on SVHN. Note that
for each comparison, we preprocessed the dataset to follow the preprocessing used when the baseline was trained; therefore,
the radii reported for CIFAR-10 here are not comparable to the radii reported elsewhere in this paper. Full experimental
details are in Appendix J.
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Figure 13. Randomized smoothing with a 20-layer resnet base classifier attains higher certified accuracy than the released models from
two recent works on certified `2 robustness.
H.2. High-probability guarantees
Appendix D details how to use CERTIFY to obtain a lower bound on the certified test accuracy at radius r of a randomized
smoothing classifier that holds with high probability over the randomness in CERTIFY. In the main paper, we declined to do
this and simply reported the approximate certified test accuracy, defined as the fraction of test examples for which CERTIFY
gives the correct prediction and certifies it at radius r. Of course, with some probability (guaranteed to be less than α), each
of these certifications is wrong.
However, we now demonstrate empirically that there is a negligible difference between a proper high-probability lower
bound on the certified accuracy and the approximate version that we reported in the paper. We created a randomized
smoothing classifier g on ImageNet with a ResNet-50 base classifier and noise level σ = 0.25. We used CERTIFY with
α = 0.001 to certify a subsample of 500 examples from the ImageNet test set. From this we computed the approximate
certified test accuracy at each radius r. Then we used the correction from Appendix D with ρ = 0.001 to obtain a lower
bound on the certified test accuracy at r that holds pointwise with probability at least 1− ρ over the randomness in CERTIFY.
Figure 14 plots both quantities as a function of r. Observe that the difference is so negligible that the lines almost overlap.
H.3. How much noise to use when training the base classifier?
In the main paper, whenever we created a randomized smoothing classifier g at noise level σ, we always trained the
corresponding base classifier f with Gaussian data augmentation at noise level σ. In Figure 15, we show the effects of
training the base classifier with a different level of Gaussian noise. Observe that g has a lower certified accuracy if f was
trained using a different noise level. It seems to be worse to train with noise < σ than to train with noise > σ.
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Figure 14. The difference between the approximate certified accuracy, and a high-probability lower bound on the certified accuracy, is
negligible.
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Figure 15. Vary training noise while holding prediction noise fixed at σ = 0.50.
I. Derivation of Prior Randomized Smoothing Guarantees
In this appendix, we derive the randomized smoothing guarantees of Lecuyer et al. (2019) and Li et al. (2018) using the
notation of our paper. Both guarantees take same general form as ours, except with a different expression for R:
Theorem (generic guarantee): Let f : Rd → Y be any deterministic or random function, and let ε ∼ N (0, σ2I). Let g
be defined as in (1). Suppose cA ∈ Y and pA, pB ∈ [0, 1] satisfy:
P(f(x+ ε) = cA) ≥ pA ≥ pB ≥ max
c 6=cA
P(f(x+ ε) = c) (19)
Then g(x+ δ) = cA for all ‖δ‖2 < R.
For convenience, define the notation X ∼ N (x, σ2I) and Y ∼ N (x+ δ, σ2I).
I.1. Lecuyer et al. (2019)
Lecuyer et al. (2019) proved a version of the generic robustness guarantee in which
R = sup
0<β≤min
(
1, 12 log
pA
pB
) σβ√
2 log
(
1.25(1+exp(β))
pA−exp(2β)pB
)
Proof. In order to avoid notation that conflicts with the rest of this paper, we use β and γ where Lecuyer et al. (2019) used 
and δ.
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Suppose that we have some 0 < β ≤ 1 and γ > 0 such that
σ2 =
‖δ‖2
β2
2 log
1.25
γ
(20)
The “Gaussian mechanism” from differential privacy guarantees that:
P(f(X) = cA) ≤ exp(β)P(f(Y ) = cA) + γ (21)
and, symmetrically,
P(f(Y ) = cB) ≤ exp(β)P(f(X) = cB) + γ (22)
See Lecuyer et al. (2019), Lemma 2 for how to obtain this form from the standard form of the (β, γ) DP definition.
Fix a perturbation δ. To guarantee that g(x + δ) = cA, we need to show that P(f(Y ) = cA) > P(f(Y ) = cB) for each
cB 6= cA.
Together, (21) and (22) imply that to guarantee P(f(Y ) = cA) > P(f(Y ) = cB) for any cB , it suffices to show that:
P(f(X) = cA) > exp(2β)P(f(X) = cB) + γ(1 + exp(β)) (23)
Therefore, in order to guarantee thatP(f(Y ) = cA) > P(f(Y ) = cB) for each cB 6= cA, by (19) it suffices to show:
pA > exp(2β)pB + γ(1 + exp(β)) (24)
Now, inverting (20), we obtain:
γ = 1.25 exp
(
− σ
2β2
2‖δ‖2
)
(25)
Plugging (25) into (24), we see that to guarantee P(f(Y ) = cA) ≥ P(f(Y ) = cB) it suffices to show that:
pA > exp(2β)pB + 1.25 exp
(
− σ
2β2
2‖δ‖2
)
(1 + exp(β)) (26)
which rearranges to:
pA − exp(2β)pB
1.25(1 + exp(β))
> exp
(
− σ
2β2
2‖δ‖2
)
(27)
Since the RHS is always positive, and the denominator on the LHS is always positive, this condition can only possibly hold
if the numerator on the LHS is positive. Therefore, we need to restrict β to
0 < β ≤ min
(
1,
1
2
log
pA
pB
)
(28)
The condition (27) is equivalent to:
‖δ‖2 log 1.25(1 + exp(β))
pA − exp(2β)pB <
σ2β2
2
(29)
Since pA ≤ 1 and pB ≥ 0, the denominator in the LHS is ≤ 1 which is in turn ≤ the numerator on the LHS. Therefore, the
term inside the log in the LHS is greater than 1, so the log term on the LHS is greater than zero. Therefore, we may divide
both sides of the inequality by the log term on the LHS to obtain:
‖δ‖2 < σ
2β2
2 log
(
1.25(1+exp(β))
pA−exp(2β)pB
) (30)
Finally, we take the square root and maximize the bound over all valid β (28) to yield:
‖δ‖ < sup
0<β≤min
(
1, 12 log
pA
pB
) σβ√
2 log
(
1.25(1+exp(β))
pA−exp(2β)pB
) (31)
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Figure 16a plots this bound at varying settings of the tuning parameter β, while Figure 16c plots how the bound varies with
β for a fixed pA and pB .
I.2. Li et al. (2018)
Li et al. (2018) proved a version of the generic robustness guarantee in which
R = sup
α>0
σ
√
− 2
α
log
(
1− pA − pB + 2
(
1
2
(pA1−α + pB1−α)1−α
))
Proof. A generalization of KL divergence, the α-Renyi divergence is an information theoretic measure of distance between
two distributions. It is parameterized by some α > 0. The α-Renyi divergence between two discrete distributions P and Q
is defined as:
Dα(P ||Q) := 1
α− 1 log
(
k∑
i=1
pαi
qα−1i
)
(32)
In the continuous case, this sum is replaced with an integral. The divergence is undefined when α = 1 since a division by
zero occurs, but the limit of Dα(P ||Q) as α→ 1 is the KL divergence between P and Q.
Li et al. (2018) prove that if P is a discrete distribution for which the highest probability class has probability ≥ pA and all
other classes have probability ≤ pB , then for any other discrete distribution Q for which
Dα(P ||Q) < − log
(
1− pA − pB + 2
(
1
2
(pA
1−α + pB1−α)1−α
))
(33)
the highest-probability class in Q is guaranteed to be the same as the highest-probability class in P .
We now apply this result to the discrete distributions P = f(X) and Q = f(Y ). If Dα(f(X)||f(Y )) satisfies (33), then it
is guaranteed that g(x) = g(x+ δ).
The data processing inequality states that applying a function to two random variables can only decrease the α-Renyi
divergence between them. In particular,
Dα(f(X)||f(Y )) ≤ Dα(X||Y ) (34)
There is a closed-form expression for the α-Renyi divergence between two Gaussians:
Dα(X||Y ) = α‖δ‖
2
2σ2
(35)
Therefore, we can guarantee that g(x+ δ) = cA so long as
α‖δ‖2
2σ2
< − log
(
1− pA − pB + 2
(
1
2
(pA
1−α + pB1−α)1−α
))
(36)
which simplifies to
‖δ‖ < σ
√
− 2
α
log
(
1− pA − pB + 2
(
1
2
(pA1−α + pB1−α)1−α
))
(37)
Finally, since this result holds for any α > 0, we may maximize over α to obtain the largest possible certified radius:
‖δ‖ < sup
α>0
σ
√
− 2
α
log
(
1− pA − pB + 2
(
1
2
(pA1−α + pB1−α)1−α
))
(38)
Figure 16b plots this bound at varying settings of the tuning parameter α, while figure 16d plots how the bound varies with
α for a fixed pA and pB .
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(a) The Lecuyer et al. (2019) bound over several settings of β. The
brown line is the pointwise supremum over all eligible β, computed
numerically.
(b) The Li et al. (2018) bound over several settings of α. The
purple line is the pointwise supremum over all eligible α, computed
numerically.
(c) Tuning the Lecuyer et al. (2019) bound wrt β when pA =
0.8, pB = 0.2
(d) Tuning the Li et al. (2018) bound wrtαwhen pA = 0.999, pB =
0.0001
J. Experiment Details
J.1. Comparison to baselines
We compared randomized smoothing against three recent approaches for `2-robust classification (Tsuzuku et al., 2018;
Wong et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2018). Tsuzuku et al. (2018) and Wong et al. (2018) propose both a robust training method
and a complementary certification mechanism, while Zhang et al. (2018) propose a method to certify generically trained
networks. In all cases we compared against networks provided by the authors. We compared against Wong et al. (2018) and
Zhang et al. (2018) on CIFAR-10, and we compared against Tsuzuku et al. (2018) on SVHN.
In image classification it is common practice to preprocess a dataset by subtracting from each channel the mean over the
dataset, and dividing each channel by the standard deviation over the dataset. However, we wanted to report certified radii
in the original image coordinates rather than in the standardized coordinates. Therefore, throughout most of this work we
first added the Gaussian noise, and then standardized the channels, before feeding the image to the base classifier. (In the
practical PyTorch implementation, the first layer of the base classifier was a layer that standardized the input.) However, all
of the baselines we compared against provided pre-trained networks which assumed that the dataset was first preprocessed
in a specific way. Therefore, when comparing against the baselines we also preprocessed the datasets first, so that we could
report certified radii that were directly comparable to the radii reported by the baseline methods.
Comparison to Wong et al. (2018) Following Wong et al. (2018), the CIFAR-10 dataset was preprocessed by subtracting
(0.485, 0.456, 0.406) and dividing by (0.225, 0.225, 0.225).
While the body of the Wong et al. (2018) paper focuses on `∞ certified robustness, their algorithm naturally extends to
`2 certified robustness, as developed in the appendix of the paper. We used three `2-trained residual networks publicly
released by the authors, each trained with a different setting of their hyperparameter  ∈ {0.157, 0.628, 2.51}. We used code
publicly released by the authors at https://github.com/locuslab/convex_adversarial/blob/master/
Certified Adversarial Robustness via Randomized Smoothing
examples/cifar_evaluate.py to compute the robustness radius of test images. The code accepts a radius and
returns TRUE (robust) or FALSE (not robust); we incorporated this subroutine into a binary search procedure to find the
largest radius for which the code returned TRUE.
For randomized smoothing we used σ = 0.6 and a 20-layer residual network base classifier. We ran CERTIFY with n0 = 100,
n = 100,000 and α = 0.001.
For both methods, we certified the full CIFAR-10 test set.
Comparison to Tsuzuku et al. (2018) Following Tsuzuku et al. (2018), the SVHN dataset was not preprocessed except
that pixels were divided by 255 so as to lie within [0, 1].
We compared against a pretrained network provided to us by the authors in which the hyperparameter of their method was
set to c = 0.1. The network was a wide residual network with 16 layers and a width factor of 4. We used the authors’ code
at https://github.com/ytsmiling/lmt to compute the robustness radius of test images.
For randomized smoothing we used σ = 0.1 and a 20-layer residual network base classifier. We ran CERTIFY with n0 = 100,
n = 100,000 and α = 0.001.
For both methods, we certified the whole SVHN test set.
Comparison to Zhang et al. (2018) Following Zhang et al. (2018), the CIFAR-10 dataset was preprocessed by subtracting
0.5 from each pixel.
We compared against the cifar 7 1024 vanilla network released by the authors, which is a 7-layer MLP. We used the
authors’ code at https://github.com/IBM/CROWN-Robustness-Certification to compute the robustness
radius of test images.
For randomized smoothing we used σ = 1.2 and a 20-layer residual network base classifier. We ran CERTIFY with n0 = 100,
n = 100,000 and α = 0.001.
For randomized smoothing, we certified the whole CIFAR-10 test set. For Zhang et al. (2018), we certified every fourth
image in the CIFAR-10 test set.
J.2. ImageNet and CIFAR-10 Experiments
Our code is available at http://github.com/locuslab/smoothing.
In order to report certified radii in the original coordinates, we first added Gaussian noise, and then standardized the data.
Specifically, in our PyTorch implementation, the first layer of the base classifier was a normalization layer that performed
a channel-wise standardization of its input. For CIFAR-10 we subtracted the dataset mean (0.4914, 0.4822, 0.4465)
and divided by the dataset standard deviation (0.2023, 0.1994, 0.2010). For ImageNet we subtracted the dataset mean
(0.485, 0.456, 0.406) and divided by the standard deviation (0.229, 0.224, 0.225).
For both ImageNet and CIFAR-10, we trained the base classifier with random horizontal flips and random crops (in addition
to the Gaussian data augmentation discussed explicitly in the paper). On ImageNet we trained with synchronous SGD on
four NVIDIA RTX 2080 Ti GPUs; training took approximately three days.
On ImageNet our base classifier used the ResNet-50 architecture provided in torchvision. On CIFAR-10 we used a
110-layer residual network from https://github.com/bearpaw/pytorch-classification.
On ImageNet we certified every 100-th image in the validation set, for 500 images total. On CIFAR-10 we certified the
whole test set.
In Figure 8 (middle) we fixed σ = 0.25 and α = 0.001 while varying the number of samples n. We did not actually vary
the number of samples n that we simulated: we kept this number fixed at 100,000 but varied the number that we fed the
Clopper-Pearson confidence interval.
In Figure 8 (right), we fixed σ = 0.25 and n =100,000 while varying α.
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J.3. Adversarial Attacks
As discussed in Section 4, we subjected smoothed classifiers to a projected gradient descent-style adversarial attack. We
now describe the details of this attack.
Let f be the base classifier and let σ be the noise level. Following Li et al. (2018), given an example (x, c) ∈ Rd × Y and a
radius r, we used a projected gradient descent style adversarial attack to optimize the objective:
arg max
δ:‖δ‖2<r
Eε∼N (0,σ2I) [`(f(x+ δ + ε), c)] (39)
where ` is the softmax loss function. (Breaking notation with the rest of the paper in which f returns a class, the function f
here refers to the function that maps an image in Rd to a vector of classwise scores.)
At each iteration of the attack, we drew k samples of noise, ε1 . . . εk ∼ N (0, σ2I), and followed the stochastic gradient
gt =
∑k
i=1∇δt`(f(x+ δt + εk), c).
As is typical (Kolter & Madry, 2018), we used a “steepest ascent” update rule, which, for the `2 norm, means that we
normalized the gradient before applying the update. The overall PGD update is: δt+1 = projr
(
δt + η
gt
‖gt‖
)
where the
function projr that projects its input onto the ball {z : ‖z‖2 ≤ r} is given by projr(z) = rzmax(r,‖z‖2) . We used a constant
step size η and a fixed number T of PGD iterations.
In practice, our step size was η = 0.1, we used T = 20 steps of PGD, and we computed the stochastic gradient using
k = 1000 Monte Carlo samples.
Unfortunately, the objective we optimize (39) is not actually the attack objective of interest. To force a misclassification, an
attacker needs to find some perturbation δ with ‖δ‖2 < r and some class cB for which
Pε∼N (0,σ2I)(f(x+ δ + ε) = cB) ≥ Pε∼N (0,σ2I)(f(x+ δ + ε) = c)
Effective adversarial attacks against randomized smoothing are outside the scope of this paper.
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K. Examples of Noisy Images
We now show examples of CIFAR-10 and ImageNet images corrupted with varying levels of noise.
σ = 0.00 σ = 0.25 σ = 0.50 σ = 1.00
Figure 17. CIFAR-10 images additively corrupted by varying levels of Gaussian noiseN (0, σ2I). Pixel values greater than 1.0 (=255) or
less than 0.0 (=0) were clipped to 1.0 or 0.0.
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σ = 0.00 σ = 0.25 σ = 0.50 σ = 1.00
Figure 18. ImageNet images additively corrupted by varying levels of Gaussian noiseN (0, σ2I). Pixel values greater than 1.0 (=255) or
less than 0.0 (=0) were clipped to 1.0 or 0.0.
